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THE RECALL
From the Standpoint of Kentucky Legal History.
By Dean C. B. Seymour, of the Law Department of the University
of Louisville.
During the one hundred and twenty years of its existence the
,State of Kentucky has had four Constitutions. Each of those
Constitutions has provided for the removal, by means other than
impeachment, of officers from office before the expiration of the
time for which they were appointed or elected. The wisdom of
these provisions has been made manifest by the history of the
state; and thoughtful Kentuckians in general have been convinced
by the local history of their State of the truth of two propositions:
First, That there should be some method other than impeach-
Iment for the removal of officers-especially judges-from office
before the end of the time for which they were appointed or
.elected.
Second, That a popular election is not a proper method for
such removal.
It has been assumed by many advocates of the Recall that the
very fact of providing for a removal is a species of Recall; but
the history of Kentucky will show the wide difference between the
,orderly methods provided in its Constitutions and the method of
a popular election.
The State of Kentucky had the good fortune to have its frame
of government shaped by enterprising, thoughtful, energetic stu-
dents of the principles of government, who had come from
Virginia and other eastern states with a view of bettering their
condition. It has been said that the Constitution of the United
States is the wisest governmental instrument ever enacted for a
iederal republic; and that the second Constitution of Kentucky
which was in force from i8oo to 1850 is the wisest instrument
ever devised by the wit of man for the government of a republic
which is not a federation. It has also been said that the statu-
tory legislation of Kentucky from 1792 to 1842 is the wisest stat-
utory legislation as a whole that the world ever had seen up to
that time. While these encomiums may perhaps be to some
extent exaggerations due to a pardonable state pride, these
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encomiums would not have been uttered by thoughtful men unless
the laws and Constitution of Kentucky had possessed great excel-
lence.
In each of the four Constitutions it is expressly provided that
the judges of the highest court may be removed from office by the
Governor on the address of two-thirds of each branch of the leg-
islature. In the two first Constitutions of Kentucky this same
provision was made applicable to the judges of the inferior courts;
in the third and the fourth Constitutions this provision is made
applicable to the judges of the circuit courts; while a different
provision is made for removal of county judges and justices of
the peace.
It is apparent that a judge may become unfitted for the dis-
charge of the duties of his office by physical or mental inability
without his own fault or that he may. prove a failure in the dis-
charge of the duties of his office. His decisions may turn out to
be hurtful and ruinous; and it is a matter of importance that the
'Commonwealth should possess the power to vacate the office in
such an event.
The great conservative element in Kentucky, which in time of
tumult and passion has prevented the wrongful removal of judges,
is found in the Senate. Under the first and the second Constitu-
tions he members of the House of Representatives were elected
annually; under the third and the fourth Constitutions they have
been elected biennially. Under the first Constitution, which lasted
only eight years, the Senate was chosen for four years by an elec-
toral college. Under the second, the third, and the fourth Con-
stitutions one-half the Senate chosen at the time of the election of
members of the House of Representatives; and the other half of
the Senate hold over. In consequence it is impossible (no matter
how great the popular majority at an election) to remove judges
by address unless at least seven out of the nineteen hold-over sen-
ators concur in the address. This gives tim6 to the people for
sober second thought.
This machinery was fully tested in the days of the "Old Court
and New Court" controversy extending from 1824 to 1826. I
propose to give a sketch in this article of the history of that con-
troversy as throwing light on the principles of Recall. Numer-
ous sketches of the time are to be found in various books; but in
some of them (at least) important facts are omitted, and in some
of them there are inaccuracies.
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In the two first Constitutions of Kentucky the only court
ordained was the Supreme Court, called the Court of Appeals.
All the other courts were statutory courts created by the legisla-
ture.
The district courts and courts of quarter session which had been
created by statute were abolished by statute in 18o2. It is gen-
erally believed that the reason for this change was dissatisfaction
with some of the rulings of these courts and a desire to legislate
the judges out of office by repealing the office itself. To guard
against a repetition of such history, the third Constitution made
the circuit courts, the county courts and the courts of justices of
the peace constitutional courts; the legislature however had the
power to create additional courts. The fourth Constitution which
took effect in 1891 forbids the creation of any courts by the legis-
lature. All the courts of Kentucky are constitutional courts. So
jealous was the Constitution of the independence of courts, that
the General Assembly cannot even create a board to determine
election contests. (Pratt v. Breckinridge, 112 Ky., i.)
Under the first and the second Constitutions the number of
judges of the Court of Appeals was not fixed by the Constitution,
'but was left to be regulated by the legislature under the analogy
of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States in
regard to the Supreme Court. (Article III, §i.) Accordingly
the Kentucky Court of Appeals originally consisted of three
judges; in i8oI a fourth judge was provided for; in 18I3 it was
provided that whenever a vacancy should happen the court should
consist of three judges only; in consequence, from 1813 until
185o there were only three judges of the Court of Appeals at a
time.
In 1824 the three judges were John Boyle, who had been
appointed in I8io; William Owsley, who had been appointed in
1812, and Benjamin Mills, who had been appointed in 182o. This
court-Boyle, Owsley and Mills-is popularly known in Kentucky
as the great court. These are the three men whom it was sought
to remove in 1824 by address; the attempt was unsuccessful.
Immediately after the close of the War of 1812 a spirit of specu-
lation pervaded the entire *state. A most exaggerated estimate
was made of .the unearned increment of real estate. Town lots
on back streets of little towns brought prices on credit that would
be esteemed fitting prices for well located property in a metrop-
olis. Men's ideas of finance were thoroughly unsound. Paper
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money was considered as money, and not as a representative of
money. The legislature of I817 chartered as many as forty
independent banks of issue; their aggregate capital amounted to
ten millions of dollars; and the right of paying the issue in notes
of the Bank of Kentucky was given them by their charters. Still
later a bahk called the "Bank of the Commonwealth" was estab-
lished; and by a legislative election of directors of the Bank of
Kentucky that bank was so re-organized as to be pledged to
receive the paper of the Bank of the Commonwealth in payment
of all debts to it. The paper of the Bank of the Commonwealth
was made receivable for public debts and taxes; practically the
only security for the final redemption of this paper was certain
lands owned by the State in the southwesTern corner of the State
of Kentucky, beyond the Tennessee River. Of course, the Bank
of Kentucky speedily suspended specie payments; and the paper
of the Bank of the Commonwealth depreciated to 50 per cent of
its face value almost immediately after the bank was created in
I82O. The condition of debtors was one of extreme distress; and
the legislature attempted to give relief. The legislative session
of I82O was a relief session. It is doubtful whether any con-
servative legislation was passed at that session. The celebrated
relief act passed at that session provided that unless a judgment
creditor should endorse on the execution his willingness to accept
paper of the Bank of the Commonwealth, or of the Bank of Ken-
tucky in discharge of it, the defendant in the execution might
replevy the debt for two years. The validity of this act neces-
sarily came before the courts. The first circuit judge to pass
upon the question was James Clark, judge of the Bourbon Circuit
Court. He had been a judge of the Court of Appeals before he
became a circuit judge. Long after the date of which we write
he became Governor of Kentucky. He decided the act to be
unconstitutional as to debts created before its enactment inasmuch
as it impaired the obligation of contracts. In 1822 he was called
before the legislature to answer for his decision and an attempt
was made to address him out of office; but it was deemed best by
a sufficient minority of the two houses to abandon the proceedings
.-and to await the decision of the Court of Appeals. On October
4, 1823, and October 11, 1823, opinions were rendered by the
Court of Appeals in Blair v. Williams and Lapsley v. Brashears,
reported in 4 Litt., pages 35 and 47, which fully sustained the con-
tention that the relief act was unconstitutional. The removal of
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the judges of the Court of Appeals by address was the issue in
the election in 1824; by a majority the relief party carried the
election. Desha was elected governor; McAfee, lieutenant-gov-
ernor; the overwhelming majority of the House of Representa-
tives, was elected by the relief party; and the relief party also
elected a majority of the new members of the Senate.
Proceedings were at once instituted for the removal of Boyle,
Owsley, and Mills by address; they were summoned before the
two houses, and had a hearing. The proposed address received
the votes of a majority of the members of the House of Repre-
sentatives; but in the Senate the vote stood 23 against 12; as there
were 38 members of the Senate, a vote of 26 would have been
required to remove the judges.
That the removal of the judges would have wrought incal-
culable harm is plain to us all to-day; but to the majority of the
people of Kentucky of that date the three judges seemed to be
judicial tyrants who were obstructing the popular will and were
in favor of the creditor class against the debtor class. Indeed
one of the toasts at the banquet given immediately after the
inauguration of Desha and McAfee was "The Constitution of
Kentucky-its interpretation is known to the people of Kentucky
and is not to be found in the breasts of three judicial tyrants."
Upon the failure of the removal proceedings, the legislature
passed a statute to repeal the law organizing the Court of Appeals
and to re-organize the Court of Appeals. It provided for the
appointment of four judges; the judges so selected were Barry,
Haggin, Trimble and Davidge. It does not appear that the ques-
tion which had been in issue as to the constitutionality of the
relief act was ever passed on by the new court.
The judges of the old court-Boyle, Owsley and Mills-
declared the act organizing a new court to be unconstitutional;
they continued to meet for the purpose of trying cases. The new
court organized and appointed a clerk and directed the clerk of
the old court, Sneed, to deliver the records to the clerk, Blair,
whom they bad appointed. Upon his refusal the records and
papers were seized and he was fined by the new court.
From December, 1824, to November, 1825, no cases were
decided by the old court which appear in the reports; but the new
court sat from April, 1825, to October 28, 1825 : and its decisions
are reported in 2 T. B. Monroe.
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In the election of 1825 the old court party was successful. The
legislature attempted to repeal the act creating the new court; but
the attempt was defeated in the Senate, the hold-over senators
being largely new court men. The Senate was composed of 38
members; the vote by which the repealing act was defeated stood
19 to 19 in the Senate; and the lieutenant-governor, McAfee, gave
the casting vote against the repeal. In 1826 the old court party
was again successful. The legislature then enacted a statute
declaring the act of 1824 unconstitutional and void and repealing
same; this act was vetoed by Governor Desha, but in Kentucky it
requires only a majoity of the members elected to each house to
pass a statute over the Governor's veto; this statute was so passed ;
and from that time the decisions of the old court have been recog-
nized as the only decisions of the Court of Appeals. The decis-
ions rendered by the new court are reported in 2 T. B. Monroe as
above stated. They have never been cited in Kentucky. Indeed
in Shepard's Annotations appears this notice, which has no doubt
puzzled many lawyers outside of Kentucky: "The 77 reported
cases of i8 Kentucky (2 T. B. Monroe) have never been referred
to by the judges of the Supreme Court."
When the legislature of Kentucky concluded to have the vor-
umes of reports number as Kentucky Reports, they began the
series with 78 Kentucky, which counts 2 T. B. Monroe a report.
In this way the history of the troublesome time above mentioned
is kept prominent in the minds of all Kentucky lawyers. For
years in the digests of Kentucky Reports it was common to have
the cases in 2 T. B. Monroe digested, and the style of the case and
citation printed in italics. While these things happened a very
long time ago, they have been kept fresh in the minds of Kentucky
lawyers. Not only are the above facts a perpetual reminder; but
there are men now in practice at the bar who studied law under
men who had passed through the troublesome period above men-
tioned; and the facts relating to the "Old Court and New Court'"
controversy are among the earliest recollection of their lives as
students. Within a week after the act of 1826 was enacted which
declared unconstitutional the repealing act, Judge Boyle was
appointed judge of the United States Court for the District of
Kentucky; Governor Desha appointed in his stead George M.
Bibb, one of the leaders of the relief party. This appointment
of course was unacceptable to the old court men. The election
of 1828 resulted in the choice of Metcalfe, an "old court" man, for
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governor; but he ran ahead of his ticket and the lieutenant-gov-
ernor and a majority of the members of the House of Representa-
tives were "new court" men. In December, 1828, 
the three
judges of the Court of Appeals resigned. The places of Owsley
and Mills were filled respectively by the appointment of 
Robert-
son and Underwood; but the office of Chief Justice 
remained
vacant for almost a year. Buckner was then appointed 
a judge
of the Court of Appeals and Robertson became Chief Justice. 
This
ended the famous controversy extending all the way from 
1-82o
to 1830.
The intensity of popular feeling is hard to describe. The 
judges
of both courts were afraid of assassination. During the 
interval
between the last reported decision of the new court 
and the first
opinion of the old court thereafter reported, an event 
occurred
which added bitterness to the controversy. Solomon P. 
Sharp,
one of the leaders of the new court party, was assassinated 
at his
residence in Frankfort; and. while it afterward turned 
out that
the assassination was in consequence of a private grudge 
which
had nothing whatever to do with politics, the death 
of Sharp
intensified the bitterness of the controversy. The 
new court
ordered its clerk to guard his records with military force 
to pre-
vent any seizure of the same by the officers of the old 
court.
I have given this history in detail; because it illustrates 
the
danger of a recall by popular election. Had such a 
recall been
possible in Kentucky, the judges would have been removed in
1824; indeed the removal of the judges was the issue in the elec-
tion of that year. On the contrary the election of 1825 
showed
a complete change in feeling; and the matters went on 
until the
election of 1826 finally disposed of the controversy.
Attempts were made to induce the circuit courts to pass 
upon
the question which of these two bodies was the Court of Appeals.
Madison C. Johnson, who afterwards became one of the leaders
of the bar, but who was then a young man, obtained license 
from
the old court to practice law. When he applied to the Woodford
Circuit Court to be sworn in as a member of that bar, objection
-was made and the validity of the act repealing the old court was
discussed before the Woodford Circuit Court by Rowan and
Sharp on the one side and by Crittenden, Wickliffe, and Robert-
son on the other. The judges of the new court were present at
the argument and advised with counsel who opposed the motion
-to admit Johnson to the bar. Judge Kelly, judge of the Wood-
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ford Circuit Court declined to pass upon the question; but as a
matter of courtesy admitted Johnson to practice at his bar.
Of course the final decision was by the people at the polls; but
by the slow deliberate process which involved at least two elec-
tions. This history seems a warning against the removal of ajudge by a single popular election. A few weeks after the passage
,of the act declaring the repeal of the court unconstitutional the
legislature passed an act giving further time to sue out writs of
.error; this was for the purpose of allowing cases to be filed on
appeal which had been delayed by reason of the controversy
between the two courts. Many of the cases decided by the new
court were decided again by the old court; and the principles were
laid down which are now elementary constitutional law with the
-people of Kentucky that while there may be a de facto judge,
there can be no de facto court; and while there may be a de facto
,officer, there can be no de facto office.
The only instance of the removal of a judge in Kentucky by
address was the removal of Joshua F. Bullitt, Chief Justice of the
Court of Appeals. Under threat of arrest by military authorities
he left the State of Kentucky and removed to Canada. The leg-
islature thereupon removed him by address on the third day of
June, 1865.
The mode of removing inferior officers is prescribed in para-
graph 227 of the present Constitution:
"Judges of the County Court, justices of the peace, sheriffs,
-coroners, surveyors, jailers, assessors, county attorneys and
constables shall be subject to indictment or prosecution for mis-feasance or malfeasance in office, or willful neglect in discharge
.of official duties, in such mode as may be prescribed by law; and
upon conviction his office shall become vacant; but such officer
-shall have the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals."
It will be observed that the right of appeal to the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky involves the power of that body to settle the
-questions of law involved as to what constitutes misfeasance or
-malfeasance in office.
In the convention of 1849 it was seriously urged that there
would be no further-need of power of removal by address, but
-that the power of impeachment was sufficient; because the Consti-
-tution adopted by that convention changed the tenure of judges
from good behavior to terms. It was thought that the shortness
-of the terms would obviate the necessity of the power of removal
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by address; but the convention and the people of Kentucky
thought otherwise.
In cases of inability of a judge from sickness to discharge the
duties of his office, even where that sickness has been protractect
through months or years no removal has ever been found neces-
sary in Kentucky. In 19o6 when one of the judges of the Court
of Appeals was ill with a protracted illness, the legislature passed
a statute authorizing the appointment of a commissioner of
appeals to discharge such duties as might be assigned him by the7
court. This office has been continued ever since irrespective of
any question of illness of any of the judges.
As above stated the circuit courts were made constitutional
courts by both the third and the fourth Constitution. Each of
these instruments, however, provided that the General Assembly
shall provide by law for holding circuit courts when from any
cause the judge shall fail to attend or if in attendance cannot
properly preside. By virtue of this section of the Constitution
the legislature has from time to time passed statutes providing for
special judges of circuit courts; and in some instances where a
circuit judge has been disabled by illness for years the business
of his court has been carried on through the medium of speciar
judges.
Of course the right of the legislature to abolish offices which
the legislature has created gives it the power in the case of all such-
offices to remove obnoxious officers by simply abolishing the7
office. It has been held that a statute creating a city office may-
authorize the removal of the city officer by the city council without
cause before his time expires. (London v. City of Franklin,
iiS Ky., 105.) Where the legislature has the power to prescribe7
duties of officers, it may change those duties during the term of
office. The two most conspicuous instances of this in Kentucky
will be found in the case of Commissioners of Sinking Fund v.
George, lO4 Ky., 26o, and Purnell v. Mann, 1O5 Ky., 87. In the-
first of these cases the Court of Appeals sustained a statute taking
out of the hands of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund the
managefiment of the penitentiary and providing for the election of'
a board of penitentiary commissioners by the legislature itself.
In the other case the Court of Appeals sustained a statute taking
away from the judge of the county court, the clerk and the sheriff
the duty of examining the returns of elections and from the judge
of the county court and the two justices of the peace the duty of'
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determining contested elections of county officers; and from the-
Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Treasurer, Auditor, and Secre-
tary of State the duty of acting as a board for determining cer-
tain kinds of contested elections. The statute provided for the
election by the legislature of three commissioners ("the State-
Board of Election Commissioners") and the appointment by them-
in each county of a county board of commissioners which should*
appoint the county officers of elections and which should itself
constitute the canvassing board for the county and the contesting-
board for the county.
There is an interesting reminder of the struggle between the-
old court and the new court (showing the attitude of Kentucky
toward the referendum) found in the provision of paragraph 6o,
of the Constitution, as follows:
"No law, except such as relates to the sale, loan or gift of
vinous, spirituous or malt liquors, bridges, turnpikes or other-
public roads, public buildings or improvements, fencing, running-
at large of stock, matters pertaining to common schools, paupers,.
and the regulation by counties, cities, towns or other municipali--
ties of their local affairs, shall be enacted to take effect upon the
approval of any other authority than the General Assembly, unless
otherwise expressly provided in this Constitution."
It is evident that this forbidding of a referendum except in the
classes of cases mentioned was brought about by recollection (on'
the part of the draftsman of that section) of the ancient struggle
between the old court and the new court. The section evinces
a determination that the legislature shall have the legislative-
authority of the state. Paragraph 6o stands as above cited; but
it simply recognizes the right of the General Assembly in cases of
the kind mentioned to provide for a referendum and does not
make it the duty of the legislature so to provide.
It will thus be seen that all through the history of Kentucky it
has been the policy of that state to confer on a central authority-
the right of removing officers. In the case of judges that-
authority consists of two-thirds of each house of the legislature.
In the case of inferior officers above named a decision of the-
circuit court removing an officer is subject to appeal to the Court
of Appeals.
The political machinery of the state in this respect three-quar-
ters of a century ago stood the severe strain of the "Old Court
and New Court" controversy; forty years later it stood the strain'
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,of the Civil War; within the last few years it has stood an intense
strain growing out of (what are believed to be) local and tem-
_porary conditions. Whatever may be the case in other states, it
seems plain that the people of Kentucky are subject to violent and
sudden fluctuations of opinion and that a majority vote at a
popular election is by no means a reasonable method (in Kentucky
,at least) for the removal of any officers. It seems further plain
that the authority to remove ought not to be the electors who
choose, but a representative of the central power of the state,--
.a body which can (if it chooses) hear argument and evidence and
which can exchange opinions by deliberation. It seems further
-plain that this body should have in it elements of stability and
should not be subject to sudden and rapid change. The Court
,of Appeals which undergoes a complete change only once in eight
years, and the legislature which undergoes a complete change only
.once in four years, have in them elements of stability; while a
-requirement of a two-thirds vote to address judges out of office
-tends to prevent any hasty and inconsiderate act.
While of course these general considerations have been pretty
fully discussed, it is possible that this review of the history of
Kentucky giving in detail the facts of political conflicts may show
-that the possibility of such violent changes is not a mere matter of
-theory, and that in the case of one great commonwealth vast
injury would have been wrought had the right of Recall been
,entrusted to a body less stable than the body to which that power
,was entrusted by the Constitution.
C. B. Seymour.
Louisville, Ky.
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